When is an exercise in logic also a logic game? by Kary, David & Wein, Sheldon
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 9
May 18th, 9:00 AM - May 21st, 5:00 PM
When is an exercise in logic also a logic game?
David Kary
Law School Admission Council
Sheldon Wein
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been
accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please
contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Kary, David and Wein, Sheldon, "When is an exercise in logic also a logic game?" (2011). OSSA Conference Archive. 77.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA9/papersandcommentaries/77
Zenker, F. (ed.). Argumentation: Cognition and Community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the 
Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18-21, 2011. Windsor, ON (CD ROM), pp. 1-11.  
When is an exercise in logic also a logic game? 
DAVID KARY 
Test Development 
Law School Admission Council 
662 Penn St, Newtown, PA 19027 
USA 
dkary@lsac.org 
ABSTRACT: This paper looks to Bernard Suits’s analysis of games and game playing for at least a partial 
answer to the question in its title. It applies Suits’s analysis to Sudoku, a popular logic puzzle, and to Ana-
lytical Reasoning, a question type in standardized assessments. The purpose is both to test Suits’s analysis 
in a novel domain and to give educators and test developers useful insight into the relationship between 
logic exercises and games. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Bernard Suits’s analysis of games and game playing has been called “the gold standard 
against which other such efforts are judged” (Kretchmar 2008: 142). This may not be an 
overstatement, given that Suits has been cited in thirty percent of articles published in the 
Journal of the Philosophy of Sport between 2000 and 2008 (Holowchak 2008: 117). This 
ubiquity is in large part attributable to the account’s remarkable resistance to counterexam-
ple, and it’s also a testament to the light that it sheds on the concept of a game. 
 Suits’s definition of game playing has been put to the test with many different 
games and game-like activities since it was first introduced in the late 1960s, but it has 
not to my knowledge been applied to logic games, by which I mean games in which win-
ning (which could amount to solving a puzzle) is achieved entirely, or at least mainly, 
through the use of deductive reasoning.
1
 This paper will address this small gap in the lit-
erature on games by applying Suits’s definition to two exercises in logic that have at 
times been characterized as logic games. While this turns out be an interesting test for 
Suits’s definition, the primary objective is to see what this definition implies about the 
boundary between a true logic game and a mere exercise in logic. 
 The first putative logic game addressed in this paper is Sudoku, which intuitively 
seems a preeminent example of a logic puzzle, hence a logic game. Sudoku has been a 
very popular recreation since it burst on the puzzle scene in 2005. Though it has its roots 
in a serious mathematical construction known as Latin squares (Freeman 2005), it was 
conceived as a recreational activity and is, to my knowledge, performed only as a recrea-
tional activity. The second putative logic game is known as Analytical Reasoning (AR). 
AR is an assessment tool in postgraduate admission tests, and it was conceived as such; it 
has been part of the LSAT since 1982 and it was part of the GRE General test until 2002. 
                                                 
1  Most games are not logic games by this definition. While many games involve deductive reasoning, it is 
usually subordinate to things like strategy, memory, verbal creativity, or mere luck. 
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Despite its serious purpose, AR is popularly called “logic games” by people preparing for 
the LSAT and by the test preparation companies that serve them. 
 Suitsian analyses of these exercises should, if all is well, give us convincing cat-
egorizations of both Sudoku and AR. The hope is that our analyses will yield insights that 
can be applied to logic games more generally. Such insights would have practical impli-
cations for anyone who wants to draw a distinction between a logic game and a close 
non-game cousin. This paper will conclude with a look at some of these implications for 
logic exercises in the contexts of teaching and testing. 
2. SUITS’S ANALYSIS OF GAME PLAYING 
To understand Suits’s definition of game playing, you need to become familiar with its 
three elements: the prelusory goal, constitutive rules, and lusory attitude. For Suits these 
are the required elements of any game.  
 The prelusory goal of a game is a goal that can be described independently of 
that game. It is a “specific achievable state of affairs” (Suits 1978: 36), such as having 
your golf ball go into the hole (by whatever means) or crossing a line on the track before 
the other racers do. This contrasts to a lusory goal, which is a goal that can be reached 
only by virtue of game play and can be described only in terms of the game itself. The 
preeminent lusory goal is winning the game, but not losing badly can also be a worthy 
lusory goal. The lusory goal is dependent on the prelusory goal in that you cannot achieve 
the lusory goal without achieving the prelusory goal.  
 If you are playing a game, you must achieve the prelusory goal in a way that 
conforms to the game’s constitutive rules. These are the rules that define the particular 
game in that “…to break a constitutive rule is to fail (at least in that respect) to play the 
game at all” (Suits 1978: 38). They do not include rules that merely regulate game play, 
like the rule in hockey that calls for a two minute penalty for hooking, and they do not 
include rules of skill—directives like “keep your stick on the ice.” The constitutive rules 
might be just a small part of the game’s associated rules, and they can be so basic that 
anyone but a neophyte takes them for granted. In golf, for example, we have the constitu-
tive rule that you may only propel the ball toward the hole using one of your clubs. In a 
footrace, we have the constitutive rule that you may not trip your competitors.  
 A crucial feature of Suits’s account is that it holds that in a game the constitutive 
rules always function to “prohibit use of the most efficient means for reaching a prelusory 
goal” (1978: 38). For Suits, constitutive rules define the game by setting up obstacles that 
you must overcome when you engage in that game.  
 The final element of Suits’s definition is that an activity does not constitute 
game playing unless the constitutive rules are accepted for the sake of making participa-
tion in that activity possible. This third requirement of game playing is known as lusory 
attitude. The fact that a game player has lusory attitude provides a minimal explanation of 
the why the player adopts rules that require using inefficient means of reaching a goal 
even when far more efficient means are available: the player does this because it makes 
participation in the game possible. 
 Everything is now in place for Suits’s definition: 
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To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory goal], using only 
means permitted by rules…, where the rules prohibit use of more efficient in favour of less 
efficient means [constitutive rules], and where the rules are accepted just because they make 
possible such activity [lusory attitude]. (1978: 41) 
3. SUDOKU 
3.1 The Basics 
The elements of Sudoku are easy to pick up. You are faced with a 9 × 9 grid, divided into 
nine 3 × 3 subgrids. The puzzle setter has already put some of the digits 1 to 9 in some of 
the grid’s 81 boxes.  To solve the puzzle, you need to complete the grid by placing one 
digit in every box in such a way that each row, each column, and each 3 × 3 subgrid con-
tains the digits 1 to 9 exactly once. A well-constructed puzzle, such as the one that fol-
lows, has a unique solution.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Sudoko grid 
In solving a Sudoku, you find yourself repeatedly relying on three main rules. The col-
umn rule says that every column in a completed puzzle must include the numerals 1 
through 9. The row rule says that every row in a completed puzzle must include the nu-
merals 1 through 9. And the subgrid rule says that every demarcated 3x3 subgrid in a 
completed puzzle must include the numerals 1 through 9. Every inference you need to 
make to complete a Sudoku is made by applying some combination of these rules to the 
partially completed grid, either to the initial numerals placed there by the puzzle setter or 
to the numerals that you place there yourself based on earlier inferences. 
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 For example, in the puzzle above, you can deduce that [f,A] must be 1 because 
there needs to be 1 in that subgrid (by the subgrid rule) and the column rule rules out 
[d,A], [d,B], and [e,B] as suitable squares. Next we can see that [d,A] must be 3 since 
[d,B] and [e,B] are ruled out by the row rule (and the subgrid rule dictates that there must 
be a 3 in that subgrid). We can now deduce that 4 and 7 must occupy [d,B] and [e,B], but 
we don’t have enough information at this point to determine which number goes in which 
square. Not all inferences in Sudoku are as easy as these, but you get the idea.  
3.1 Is Sudoku a Game? 
It’s easy to see that despite the use of numerals, solving a Sudoku puzzle is a matter of 
logic. But is it a logic game? To apply Suits’s definition, we’ll have to identify a candi-
date for the prelusory goal of Sudoku: a specific achievable state of affairs that can be 
described independently of the game of Sudoku. Our candidate for the prelusory goal 
needs to leave room for the constitutive rules; if a constitutive rule were built into our de-
scription, we would be on our way to describing the lusory goal. With this in mind, the 
best candidate for the prelusory goal of Sudoku is nothing more complicated than placing 
digits in the unfilled squares of the grid.   
 The constitutive rules of Sudoku would have to include the column rule, the row 
rule, and the subgrid rule, and you can also add the implicit rule that you should not place 
more than one digit in a square. And you can also add the general rule for puzzles that 
forbids peeking at the answer (if there is one available). 
 The puzzle-setter’s initial placement of digits could be interpreted as being another 
set of rules in Sudoku; each placement could be understood as being a rule of the form 
“there must be an n in position [x,Y].” Like the constitutive rules that we’ve identified, the-
se “rules” also prohibit the most efficient means of attaining a prelusory goal. But it would 
be a mistake to hold that the initial placement belongs to the set of constitutive rules. Our 
task is to identify the constitutive rules for Sudoku as a general activity, not to identify the 
constitutive rules for one particular Sudoku puzzle. The puzzle setter’s initial placement of 
digits is akin to the initial placement of the playing cards at the start of a game of solitaire. 
 Two elements of game playing are in place for Sudoku. The third, lusory atti-
tude, falls into place quite naturally. In the typical case, the aspiring Sudoku-solver ac-
cepts the constitutive rules of Sudoku because she wants to solve the puzzle for the sake 
of inherent enjoyment. She accepts the rules because doing so makes it possible to partic-
ipate in that activity and she thus has lusory attitude. There could also be atypical cases, in 
which someone does Sudoku puzzles for instrumental reasons—e.g., in order to impress 
someone or to win cash prizes at Sudoku tournaments. But even in these cases the Sudoku-
solver is also accepting the rules of Sudoku because doing so makes the activity possible. It 
hardly seems possible to imagine a Sudoku aficionado who doesn’t have lusory attitude, 
and so doing a Sudoku puzzle is clearly an instance of game playing by Suits’s definition.  
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4. ANALYTICAL REASONING (AR) 
4.1 The Basics 
An AR exercise begins with what we’ll call its setup. This generally begins with a de-
scription of a situation in which an actor needs to accomplish a particular task. (The actor 
may or may not be explicitly mentioned.) The tasks typically involve ordering a set of 
entities appropriately, grouping entities appropriately, or both ordering and grouping. The 
initial description is followed in the setup by a number of rule-like constraints on the 
completion of the task. The setup itself is followed by a series of multiple-choice ques-
tions that force you to comprehend what must be true and what could be true in the situa-
tion you’ve been presented with. 
 Here is an AR setup from the December 2009 LSAT:  
A museum curator is arranging seven photographs—Fence, Gardenias, Hibiscus, Irises, Ka-
tydid, Lotus, and Magnolia—on a gallery wall in accordance with the photographer's  
requirements. The photographs are to be hung along the wall in a row, in seven positions  
sequentially numbered from first to seventh. The photographer's requirements are as follows: 
Gardenias must be immediately before Katydid. 
Hibiscus must be somewhere before Katydid but cannot be the first photograph. 
Irises and Lotus must be next to one another. 
Magnolia must be one of the first three photographs. 
Fence must be either first or seventh. 
The AR setup is always followed by a number of questions such as this one:  
Where each photograph is hung is fully determined if which one of the following is true? 
 
(A) Gardenias is fourth. 
(B) Hibiscus is second. 
(C) Irises is second. 
(D) Lotus is first. 
(E) Magnolia is third.  
 
(Setup and question © 2009 by Law School Admission Council, Inc.) 
One could approach this question by considering (and possibly diagramming) the conse-
quences of each of the five options in turn until you find the one that fully determines the 
positions of the photographs. A less ‘brute-force’ approach (and perhaps a more efficient 
one time-wise) is to first find an option that you think—given your understanding of the 
photographer’s five requirements—will unleash a set of consequences that tightly con-
strains the positions of the photographs. You can then test out that option to see if it fully 
determines their positions.  
 Given the photographer’s third and fourth requirements, you can see that (D) is 
going to result in knowing that Lotus, Irises, and Magnolia, in that order, go to the first 
three positions. Now, you can see from the fifth condition that Fence goes to the seventh 
position. The first and second condition now tell you that Hibiscus, Gardenias, and Katy-
did will go to positions four, five, and six, respectively. And so we have our answer. 
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 The AR setup together with its associated questions is referred to as an AR set. 
AR sets are administered under timed conditions in standardized tests. In the LSAT, for 
example, candidates have 35 minutes to complete four sets of five to seven AR questions. 
4.2 Is AR a Game? 
In identifying likely candidates for the prelusory goal and constitutive rules of AR it is 
important to not get distracted by the setup of the AR exercise, which invariably identi-
fies a goal and sets out a number of explicit rule-like conditions. These rule-like condi-
tions look like the constitutive rules we seek, in that they prohibit the most efficient 
means of reaching the goal stated in the AR setup in favour of some less efficient means.  
Moreover, these conditions were clearly devised for the sake of supporting the inferences in 
an AR set (i.e., for the sake of making the AR set possible). But we need to recognize that 
the goal identified within an AR setup (e.g., determining the placement of the photographs 
on the gallery wall) could not possibly serve as a prelusory goal of AR because that goal 
belongs to a fictive actor that has been either presupposed or explicitly identified within the 
AR setup (e.g., the museum curator). The prelusory goal that we are looking for would be 
one held by the real people who tackle AR sets. (We’ll call them AR takers hereafter.) 
 The AR taker needs to analyze a problem faced by the fictive actor in the setup, 
so it’s as if the AR taker is engaging in the fictive activity. But this is merely a stance that 
the AR taker adopts as a means to attaining her own goal of getting the correct answers 
for a set of multiple choice questions. This goal is our best (and only) candidate for the 
prelusory goal of AR, but one more thing needs to be specified. The prelusory goal of AR 
needs to be free of limitations on the means by which you may obtain the correct answers 
to the questions. Those limitations are the province of the constitutive rules. So if an AR 
exercise has a prelusory goal it must be this: to get as many correct answers as possible to 
the associated questions, by whatever means you choose.  
 For the constitutive rules of AR we need to find rules that encompass all possi-
ble AR sets, and this means bypassing the rules in the conditions stated within each AR 
setup. In doing this we follow the same approach we took with Sudoku, in which we 
identified constitutive rules that apply to every possible Sudoku puzzle and did not look 
for constitutive rules in the puzzle-setter’s initial placement of digits in the grid.  
 But AR is not a tightly circumscribed activity like Sudoku, which always has the 
same basic framework and the same three explicit rules (the column rule, the row rule 
and the subgrid rule). AR setups can have many different structures and can incorporate 
many different types of constraints. Perhaps that explains why we are able to identify just 
two constitutive rules for AR.  
 The first of these constitutive rules can be summed up as follows: answer the 
questions by means of reasoning alone. This rule has the function of a constitutive rule in 
that it prohibits more efficient means of achieving the prelusory goal in favour of less ef-
ficient means. It also distinguishes AR from certain similar activities that we would not 
countenance as AR. Consider the various prohibitions that follow from this directive, in-
cluding a prohibition on copying your answers from your neighbour, a prohibition on us-
ing psychic clairvoyance to identify the correct answers (if you should happen to possess 
this extraordinary gift), and a prohibition on using a computerized AR-solver. Anyone 
who violates one of these prohibitions is not doing AR as we know it. The answer-copier 
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is not really doing AR but cheating at AR. The clairvoyant is exercising a remarkable 
skill, but that skill has little to do with AR and could presumably work just as well with 
any other test question. And the user of the AR-solver, even if she were to program this 
ingenious device herself, is not doing AR either.
 
 
 The second constitutive rule that we can discern for AR is a prohibition on using 
more than the allotted time to complete the AR sets. This rule applies to AR only when it is 
a timed activity, as in actual testing conditions or in a timed practice. It would not apply, of 
course, to someone tackling AR questions without time constraints, for practice or whatev-
er reason. This latter activity also seems intuitively to count as taking AR, but we will not 
examine it here. We limit our attention to AR taken under timed test conditions: this activi-
ty seems definitive for AR and it poses the more interesting challenge for Suits’s account. 
 These two constitutive rules are certainly not unique to AR. The first is also a 
constitutive rule of Sudoku and other logic games. And both rules are constitutive for any 
timed test of reasoning. Still, these constitutive rules are all we need to identify for the 
purposes of this paper. Just one constitutive rule would suffice so long as we can discern 
the relationship between that rule and the prelusory goal and the rule gives us an adequate 
basis for assessing the AR takers’ lusory attitude.2 
 This brings us to the question of whether the AR taker has lusory attitude. Recall 
that to have lusory attitude regarding a particular activity, it must be true that “the [consti-
tutive] rules are accepted just because they make possible such activity.”  
 One might think that AR takers quite clearly fail to have lusory attitude because 
they accept the constitutive rules not just for the sake of making the activity possible but 
for instrumental reasons too: they also accept those rules because they want to get good 
scores on a standardized test and want to gain acceptance into a postgraduate program. 
This is not how Suits’s notion of lusory attitude works however: Suits makes it clear that 
lusory attitude should not be understood as excluding the possibility that the constitutive 
rules are also accepted for some other reasons. Instead, lusory attitude should be under-
stood merely as excluding the possibility that constitutive rules are accepted for reasons 
that are not also reasons for making the activity possible. (1978:144) If lusory attitude is 
properly understood then, we see that the mere fact that there are instrumental reasons for 
taking AR does not mean that the AR taker is not playing a game. Or as Suits puts it more 
generally, “…games can function as instruments without thereby ceasing to be games…” 
(1978: 146). 
 To reach a verdict about whether the AR taker has lusory attitude, it is useful to 
consider an example that Suits gives of someone who clearly lacks lusory attitude.  
Smith arrives at the starting line of the 200 metre finals just as the race is about to begin. He 
has only that moment learned that a time bomb has been planted in the grandstand at the fin-
ish line (which is located on the other side of the oval track at a point directly opposite the 
starting line), and that it will go off in a matter of seconds. The information has so shocked 
Smith that he is temporarily bereft of speech and so cannot warn anyone of the impending ca-
tastrophe. His first impulse is to run straight across the infield and defuse the bomb, but he 
                                                 
2  Even if these were the only constitutive rules of AR, it would not be a problem for Suits’s account, 
which is amenable to games having a very minimal set of constitutive rules. Suits (1978: 82-87) argued 
that mountain climbing, for example, meets his definition of a game, based on a constitutive rule that 
prohibits one from reaching a summit using mechanical transport, even if this is a mere limitation in 
principle, as it is for mountains on which mechanical transport is infeasible.  
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sees with dismay that the infield has been fenced off with a high chain-link barrier, evidently 
to protect spectators and participants from the fifty or so man-eating tigers that roam hungrily 
inside the enclosure. At the instant Smith realizes that his only hope of getting to the bomb in 
time is to make a half circuit of the track, the starting gun is fired, and Smith and the other 
entrants are off and running hard. (1978: 145) 
Smith runs the race without violating any constitutive rule of the 200 metre sprint, and he 
has the appropriate prelusory goal—that of crossing the finish line. But Smith is not par-
ticipating in a competitive game like the other sprinters. Smith lacks lusory attitude be-
cause, unlike the other sprinters who accept the rules because they want to participate in 
the competition, Smith acted within the rules because there was no other means of reach-
ing the bomb in time. “Clearly, his attitude toward the rules was not that they made pos-
sible a foot race, for if he had found his voice or if the infield had been safe and clear, he 
would not have been running around the track at all” (1978: 145). 
 Compare Smith with a one example of someone who has lusory attitude and for 
whom a game functions as an instrument—the professional athlete. The fact that the constitu-
tive rules of the game make the activity possible is always a reason that the professional ath-
lete accepts those rules. This might be because he enjoys playing the game, but even if he 
does not enjoy playing it, he has a financial interest in making the activity possible. His rea-
sons for accepting the constitutive rules are also reasons for making the activity possible. 
 The question of whether the AR taker has lusory attitude comes down to whether 
the AR taker is of a kind with Smith the sprinter or of a kind with the professional athlete. 
There is no tidy answer to this question, however. While Smith and the professional ath-
lete are in situations that make their attitudes toward the constitutive rules clear, there are 
a variety of reasons for which AR takers might accept the constitutive rules of AR. Con-
sider three possible reasons in turn.  
 First, suppose that the reason that the AR taker abides by the two constitutive 
rules that we’ve identified is the test supervisors’ enforcement of rules that leave reason-
ing ability as her only available means of answering the questions and that prevent her 
from using more than her allotted time. This AR taker accepts the constitutive rules be-
cause she has no choice in the matter, given her desire to be admitted to a postgraduate 
program. Like Smith, she is in a situation in which acting within the constitutive rules is 
the only way to get what she wants, and if some other means of achieving the prelusory 
goal were available to her and she deemed that means to be a more efficient, she would 
use that means. So, just like Smith, this AR taker lacks lusory attitude. 
 Now suppose instead that the AR taker abides by the two constitutive rules for 
ethical reasons. She recognizes that it is ethically wrong to cheat on a standardized test and 
recognizes that any violation of the constitutive rules that would possibly serve her purpos-
es (e.g., copying someone else’s answers) would constitute cheating. The similarity to 
Smith is not as strong in this case because the constraints are not imposed externally. It is 
nevertheless clear that this AR taker does not have lusory attitude since her reason for ac-
cepting the constitutive rules of AR is not also a reason for making the activity possible. 
 Finally, suppose instead that the AR taker is antecedently disposed to seek excel-
lence in AR and like activities. The excellence that this AR taker seeks is inextricably 
bound to abiding by the two constitutive rules. So this person accepts the constitutive rules 
of AR because those rules make participation in that activity possible. Suppose further that 
this person’s disposition to seek excellence is strong enough that the ethical reasons for ac-
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cepting the constitutive rules do not come into play for her, nor does the threat of enforce-
ment. This AR taker has lusory attitude. She might also be taking AR for an instrumental 
reason—to gain admission into a certain postgraduate program—but this reason is also a 
reason for making the activity possible. As with the professional athlete, the fact that excel-
lence in the activity serves instrumental purposes does not preclude lusory attitude. 
 While hard empirical evidence about people’s reasons for accepting the constitu-
tive rules of AR is not available, it seems very likely that there are some AR takers of each 
sort described above. Ethical reasons for accepting the constitutive rules and enforcement-
motivated reasons are surely in play for AR takers. These are the standard and familiar mo-
tivations for not cheating on a test. As for the third sort of AR taker, she might be a rare 
individual, but she’s not wildly out of the ordinary. This person is dedicated to the pursuit 
of excellence in exercising her reasoning abilities, and this dedication is not outweighed by 
a dedication to achieving the prelusory goal, that of getting as many correct answers as pos-
sible. So she needs no reason other than this disposition toward excellence to abide by the 
constitutive rules of AR. Note that this state of affairs does not have to come about because 
of an extreme dedication to the pursuit of excellence in reasoning; it can also come about 
because of a comparatively modest commitment to AR’s prelusory goal.  
 We conclude with some confidence then that AR is a game for some people who 
engage in it and that it is not a game for others. The distinction between those AR takers 
who are playing a game and those who are not rests on individual dispositions. The AR 
taker who is playing a game seeks excellence in that activity for its own sake, for the in-
strumental benefits to be gained from excellent performance, and for no other reason. 
Thus her reasons are consonant with lusory attitude. AR takers who are not playing a 
game seek excellence in AR for instrumental purposes and they might also seek excel-
lence for its own sake, but they also have other reasons for accepting the constitutive 
rules—ones that are not reasons for making the activity possible. These reasons are not 
consistent with lusory attitude. 
4.3 What AR Tells Us about Suits’s Account 
This mixed verdict on AR—that it is a game in some instances and is not a game in oth-
ers—does not amount to a break from Suits’s stated views. Suits’s account allows that 
one competitor might be playing a game while another in the same event might be failing 
to play a game, as Suits himself makes clear regarding Smith the sprinter: “I put it to you 
that…the other runners are playing a game but that Smith is not, and that this is so be-
cause the other runners have lusory attitude and Smith does not” (1978: 145). 
 Neither should this mixed verdict lead us to think any less of Suits’s account of 
game playing. The idea that AR can be a game for some people has intuitive appeal. 
Some people actually sit down to solve AR sets for enjoyment alone. So it should not 
come as a surprise that an activity such as this should be recognized as game playing un-
der Suits’s definition, which is generally recognized as being a very inclusive one. (See 
Kretchmar 2008: 144.)  
 One might think that Suits’s definition should give an unequivocal answer to the 
question of whether AR is a game, but that betrays a misunderstanding of Suits’s project. 
Suits does not actually engage in a direct analysis of games: he never speaks of the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions under which X is a game but is always careful to speak of 
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the necessary and sufficient conditions of what it is to play a game (1968: 148; 1978: 41; 
1988: 11). Many of those who build on Suits’s work are similarly careful to preserve this 
distinction (Hurka 2006: 217) though some seem to glide over it (Kretchmar 2008: 142). 
Of course, the fact that Suits did not analyze games directly did not prevent him from 
reaching conclusions about games; it merely meant that what he concluded about games 
was derived from his analysis of game playing.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 For Educators 
Educators who try to include games (logic games or otherwise) in their course work can 
sometimes face the question of whether the exercises that they have in mind really are 
games. Our conclusion about AR leads to a reframing of this question, however. Our 
analysis of AR, if it is correct, suggests that the pertinent question for these educators 
might not be whether a particular exercise is or is not a game, but for how many students 
is the exercise a game.  
 If AR can be a game for some people but not for others, there is good reason to 
believe that the same can hold true of classroom logic exercises. This is not so much be-
cause of similarity in content, but because both AR and classroom logic exercises are 
compulsory activities. AR is compulsory for anyone who wants to gain admission into cer-
tain postgraduate programs and classroom exercises are generally a compulsory part of the 
syllabus. So AR and would-be classroom games have in common the fact that they bring 
people who are predisposed to seek excellence in those sorts of activities together with 
people with little inclination to do so. The usual sorts of games, like baseball or Parcheesi, 
don’t do this. Players of those games are generally a self-selected lot: those with an appre-
ciation for the game choose to play and those without such an appreciation choose not to.  
 The reframing of the question leads to the issue of whether a classroom logic 
exercise can be enhanced to increase the number of students who experience it as a game. 
The picture that emerged from our Suitsian analysis of AR and from our comparisons be-
tween AR and Sudoku is that the crucial element that can make a logic exercise a game is 
the participants’ disposition toward that exercise—whether they possess lusory attitude. 
Logic exercises like AR and Sudoku meet the other requirements of game playing—a 
prelusory goal and constitutive rules—leaving lusory attitude as the make-or-break re-
quirement. So the question becomes that of whether and how lusory attitude can be en-
couraged among students. A full answer to that question is beyond the scope of this pa-
per, but it certainly does seem that lusory attitude can be encouraged by engineering logic 
exercises in just the right way. This engineering needn’t change the actual content of a 
logic exercise; it can be confined to the setting for that content. For example, elements of 
competition, reward, recognition, and “team play” can by themselves change participants’ 
attitudes toward an activity.  
5.2 For Test Developers 
Some test developers are interested in designing tests of cognitive skills that test takers 
will experience as games (Shute et al., 2008: 1-7). The preceding conclusions for educa-
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tors also apply to their situation. Most developers of major standardized tests, however, 
are probably keen to avoid elements of game play in their tests. Standardized tests, after 
all, are an important part of the educational system with life-changing consequences for 
many thousands. Hence the charge that people’s futures are affected by their performance 
on mere ‘games’ could be a stinging accusation. For test developers who shun ‘gaminess’ 
in their assessments, however, the results of our Suitsian analysis of AR should not be 
troubling. While AR might be game playing for a small percentage of the people who en-
gage in it, it is unreasonable to say that an activity is a game in any robust sense if it is 
experienced as a game by just a small minority of participants. After all, if some people 
managed to make filling out their tax forms into a game, that would not mean that doing 
taxes is a game. Suits’s account does not support the view that AR is a logic game in the 
full sense—the “fully subscribed” sense in which Sudoku is a logic game. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
David Kary’s “When is an Exercise in Logic also a Logic Game?” uses Bernard Suits’s 
analysis of game playing to illuminate a difference between Sudoku and Analytical Rea-
soning (AR) in the form of logic exercises. I am sympathetic both to Suits’s account of 
game playing and the way in which Kary deploys it. In this commentary I will confine 
myself to raising a worry about Suits’s account of game playing and use that worry to 
suggest that the difference between Sudoku and the sorts of logic exercises used in rea-
soning courses and on standardized tests may not be as substantial as Kary thinks. None 
of this undermines Kary’s main claims. The best I can hope to accomplish in this com-
mentary is illumination through nitpicking.  
2. TO PLAY A GAME 
As Kary notes, Suits’s wonderful and delightful book, The Grasshopper: Games, Life, 
and Utopia defines game playing as:   
to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory goal], using only means permitted 
by rules [lusory means], where the rules prohibit use of more efficient in favour of less effi-
cient means [constitutive rules], and where the rules are accepted just because they make 
possible such activity [lusory attitude] (1978: 41, square brackets in original). 
For an activity to be an instance of playing a game it must meet all three necessary condi-
tions, conditions which are jointly sufficient.
1
 Sudoku is, our intuitions tell us, clearly a 
game. And, not surprisingly, the gold standard account of game playing agrees with intuition 
in holding that, except in rare circumstances, those who play Sudoku are playing a game. On 
this, Kary’s analysis seems to be to be correct. Yet Kary’s position is that only a rare few of 
those engaged in AR are game playing. About this latter point I am sceptical. 
  
                                                 
1 As Suits would say, once you have everything that is necessary you have what is sufficient. If in supposed-
ly having everything that was necessary you did not, simply in virtue of that, have what was sufficient, 
then obviously there was something that was necessary that you did not yet have. Once you have every-
thing that is necessary you necessarily, have what is sufficient. See Wein 1980 for my views on definition. 
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3. SUDOKU, ANALYTICAL REASONING, AND TWIN EARTH 
Suppose Hilary Putnam was wrong about Twin Earth. Putnam said that the only differ-
ence between Twin Earth and here was some obscure difference between the molecular 
structure of what we and Twin Earthers both call “water”.2 But suppose that, in fact, on 
Twin Earth the best way to attract sexual partners (at least among a significant segment of 
the population) is to take up Sudoku and love doing it for its own sake. (Whether this is 
caused by a difference between XYZ and H2O or not is something I will leave to those 
whose leanings are less Humean than mine.) Once people noticed that a sufficiently sexy 
part of the population was sexually attracted to people who played Sudoku for its own 
sake, many people who were not attracted to Sudoku for its own sake nonetheless took up 
the game. Some realized that the best way to develop a love for Sudoku was to get good 
at playing Sudoku and that the best way to do that is to start playing Sudoku. Their goal 
was to get good enough at Sudoku so that they might come to play it for its own sake so 
that they thereby might have a better chance at having sex with those sexy lovers of true 
Sudoku lovers. Others, realizing that only those Sudoku players who love the game for its 
own sake were succeeding in finding sex partners through Sudoku, hoped that, were they 
to be seen playing Sudoku, they might be mistaken for people who loved the game for its 
own sake. Perhaps they were too lazy to do the work to change their preferences, or per-
haps they reasoned that people make mistakes about other people’s attitudes all the time 
and, who knows, I might be among the lucky ones and get lucky. Finally some—perhaps 
because hormones were impeding their powers of observation—never even noticed that 
Sudoku was a game or that among Sudoku players only those who loved Sudoku for its 
own sake were regularly hooking up with local hotties. They took up Sudoku entirely for 
instrumental reasons (and instrumental reasons based on false beliefs).  
 Now all four groups—the original Sudoku players who played the game for its 
own sake; those who took up Sudoku hoping to come to like Sudoku for its own sake and 
then reap the consequences they noticed followed from having that intrinsic desire; those 
who took up Sudoku hoping they would be mistaken for as someone who liked Sudoku 
for its own sake and would then enjoy the consequences that might follow from that mis-
take; and those who took up Sudoku for the purpose of making themselves sexually at-
tractive by engaging in an activity in which they had no interest—are all playing Sudoku. 
The first group clearly meets all three of Suits’s conditions. So does the second group. 
Indeed, many game players start out just this way before moving into the first group. (“I 
took up tennis to help lose a few pounds but now I just love the game” or “I took up Su-
doku hoping it would slow the onset of senility but now I just love playing it.”) The third 
and fourth groups are a bit trickier. Their members lack the perfect lusory attitude. In-
deed, the members of the third group recognize, this fact though the less observant mem-
bers of the fourth group do not. But I fail to see how members of either group differ from, 
say, those professional athletes who (as we say of them) are playing just for the money. 
These last two groups of Sudoku players are playing just for the sex, but playing Sudoku 
they are. So they have to fit into Suits’s account of game players. 
 But how do these two groups differ from those who engage in AR because doing 
AR is, say, a way get into law school? Some will have practiced AR in LSAT preparation 
                                                 
2  This is the way he puts it in Putnam 1981 but in Putnam 1992 (responding to problems raised by A.J. 
Ayer) Putnam backs away from his earlier Kripkean essentialist position. 
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courses and discovered that they just love doing AR games for their own sake. Indeed, 
some of them may have come to like doing this so much that they abandon their ambi-
tions to go to law school and instead devote their lives, Grasshopper like, to playing AR 
games. They are like my first group of Sudoku players, and clearly these folks have the 
lusory attitude and for them AR is a game. Others will have taken LSAT preparation 
courses and realized about themselves that if only they could get good enough at doing 
AR they could love doing AR for its own sake. Surely these are just like my second 
group of Sudoku players, of whom we had no trouble saying were playing a game when 
they played Sudoku. Still others, while doing AR exercises in preparation for the LSAT, 
will wish that they liked the game more so that doing the preparation was not such a 
chore. And, while it is the case that these folks don’t particularly care whether the LSAT 
markers (presumably, machines) think they liked doing AR, they very much care that the 
LSAT markers take them to be good at AR. They might even hope that a high LSAT 
score will convince law school admission committees that they are the sort of person who 
is not just good at doing AR but likely likes doing AR. They are like my third group of 
Sudoku players. Finally, there are those who are like that final group of Sudoku players: 
they do not like AR, nor do they adopt the lusory attitude for its own sake. But it seems to 
me that on the Suits/Kary account, even these people are playing AR, just as much as my 
last group of Sudoku players who only want to hook up with someone. 
4. CONCLUSION 
A virtue of Kary’s analysis is that it makes us realize in quite a graphic way something 
that Suits observed. Given certain circumstances—circumstances that more and more 
members of our species are finding themselves in—many activities which we once 
thought of as non-game playing will become instances of game playing. Lots of people 
trying to get into graduate or professional schools may not think that the things they have 
to do to get into such schools are playing games. But that is, nevertheless, what they are. 
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